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Unlike discounting and the damage function, the social welfare function has not received so 
much attention in the debate on climate economics. An important challenge has been to 
combine efficiency and equity considerations in a single social welfare framework. The 
Chichilnisky criterion is one way to resolve this. We consider its implementation in the climate-
economy model Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE), and compare results for 
different damage functions, namely the standard one in DICE and the one proposed by 
Weitzman implying potential large climate damages at high temperature increases. We calculate 
optimal climate policy for different parameter settings and compare the results with those under 
the green golden rule (only final utility matters) and classical utilitarianism (no discounting). 
Optimal emission abatement trajectories turn out to be very different between standard dis-
counted utilitarianism, classical utilitarianism and Chichilnisky specifications. The results are 
very sensitive to the damage function, the climate sensitivity parameter and especially the 
“Chichilnisky weight” given to utility of generations in the far future. We discuss conditions 
and reasons for preferring either classical utilitarianism or the Chichilnisky criterion, and 
conclude that a critical factor is the time horizon used in climate policy analysis. Adopting 
sustainable preferences as formalized by the Chichilnisky criterion in climate policy analysis 
has the advantage that the very long-term implications of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
on the environment and human welfare are not downplayed.
Keywords: Chichilnisky welfare criterion; classical utilitarianism; climate change; DICE model; 
Weitzman damage function.
1. Introduction
Unlike discounting and the economic damage function, the social welfare function has 
received rather sparse attention in the debate on climate economics. This is surprising, 
as very different choices of the welfare function are possible, which give more or less 
weight to risk aversion to uncertain climate change impacts, or to concerns about the 
trade-off between efficiency, equity and sustainability (Tol, 2002). The latter trade-off 
has received very much attention in the literature on sustainable development (Toman 
et al., 1995). In the context of climate change, arguably the most worrisome sus-
tainability problem currently faced by humanity, various alternative social welfare 
functions have been tested. Botzen and van den Bergh (2014) give an account of these 
studies and show that a more systematic approach is needed to deal with at least 14 
core approaches that span the space of possible social welfare functions. Here, we 
focus on the treatment of intergeneration equity and long-term sustainability, which is 
especially relevant for climate policy because of the very long-term nature of impacts 
caused by greenhouse gas emissions (Roemer, 2011; Dietz and Asheim, 2012).
The formal method followed takes a discounted utility or net present value (NPV) 
approach as the starting point and modifies it by adding a component and a set of 
weights to it. This is motivated by the recognition in sustainability studies that we need 
to combine efficiency and equity considerations in a single social welfare framework. 
The Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) criterion represents a concrete method to achieve this. It 
maximizes a weighted average of a discounted sum of utilities plus the terminal utility 
value. This criterion is motivated by axioms stating that present decisions should not 
disregard the far future, while sensitivity to present welfare implications should be 
accounted for. For a theoretical analysis of axioms of the this criterion we refer to the 
original work of Chichilnisky (1996, 1997). The objective of our study is to examine 
how the implementation of the Chichilnisky criterion influences advice about optimal 
climate policy and how this depends on important parameter assumptions. This 
requires examining how particular climate dynamics and feedback (utility damage) 
will work out in terms of the Chichilnisky criterion compared to other criteria. Since 
climate dynamics is complex, there is no other way than working with concrete 
climate-economy models. We consider its implementation in the climate-economy 
model Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) (Nordhaus, 2008) as it is fairly 
simple, and has been shown to be suitable for addressing theory-motivated questions.
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It allows to study how changes in, or additions to, the DICE framework alter its basic 
findings and policy advice. It also allows for comparison of results under distinct 
damage functions, such as of the “Nordhaus” and more extreme “Weitzman” type. We 
will further examine sensitivity of the Chichilnisky criterion to the adopted discount 
rate, in view of this having received much debate.
The DICE model by William Nordhaus is one of the most studied economic models 
of optimal climate policy (Nordhaus, 1991, 1994, 2008; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). 
DICE has been much debated while alternative formulations have been proposed and 
analyzed.
We calculate optimal climate policy for different parameter settings, focusing on the 
damage function and the weight given to utility of a generation in the far future. We 
further compare the results with those obtained for a social welfare function that gives 
equal weight to each generation, i.e., classical utilitarianism or no intergenerational 
discounting. As no information is provided in papers by Chichilnisky on which 
weights to use, we undertake sensitivity analysis on this, including considering only 
the final utility term as the social welfare function, which comes down to giving the 
full weight to this term, also known as the “green golden rule”.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the 
DICE model. Section 3 presents the Chichilnisky criterion and summarizes the 
(mainly) theoretical literature on it. Section 4 performs simulations with the Chichil-
nisky-adapted DICE model, and compares its behavior with NPV and classical 
utilitarianism approaches. Section 5 concludes.
2. Climate Economics with DICE
In the early 1990s William Nordhaus developed DICE, an integrated assessment model 
(IAM) combining a Ramsey-type optimal economic growth model and an aggregate 
climate module. This describes the cause-effect chain from economic production, 
through carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and atmospheric concentrations, to temper-
ature changes, sea level rise, and (extreme) weather patterns and events and ultimately 
economic damages. The model reflects damages in various economic sectors, notably 
agriculture, farming, forestry, tourism, water, energy and real estate (human settle-
ments), as well as impacts on human health and ecosystems. DICE allows calculating 
optimal time paths of emission reduction and carbon taxes. DICE has seen many 
adaptations and extensions, dealing with learning, irreversible investments, endoge-
nous technological change, adaptation and alternative damage functions (e.g., Pizer, 
1999; Popp, 2005; de Bruin et al., 2009; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012; Hwang 
et al., 2013; Ackerman et al., 2013). We apply the DICE-2008 model (Nordhaus, 
2008) in the optimization software GAMS. We follow the certainty-equivalent 
approach of Nordhaus (2008), which uses expected values of all parameters. In this 
way, we can directly compare our findings with the original DICE results. Unless 
stated otherwise we use the standard parameters of DICE (Nordhaus, 2008).
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W ¼
XT max
t¼1
U[c(t), L(t)]R(t): (1)
The utility function is of the form U[c(t),L(t)] ¼ L(t)[c(t)1=(1 )], where c(t) and
L(t) are per capita consumption and population at time t, respectively, while  is the
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption which in all of our runs equals the
standard value in DICE of 2 (Nordhaus, 2008). Population growth is exogenous in
DICE. The social time preference discount factor is R(t) ¼ (1þ )t, where  is the
pure rate of social time preference. The appropriate value of  has been hotly debated,
especially since Stern (2007) showed that using a lower value (0.1%) than was
common (like 1.5% in DICE-2008) on grounds of intergenerational equity implies
much larger optimal reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to applying
(1) with the standard DICE discount rate which we will call “standard NPV”, we apply
classical utilitarianism in DICE by setting  ¼ 0.1
Another important component of the DICE model is the damage function. The
standard damage function used by Nordhaus (2008) has the following specification:
(t) ¼ 1=[1þ 0:0028TAT (t)2]: (2)
Here (t) represents one minus the fraction of aggregate output (in trillion US$) lost
due to climate change, t is time (decades in DICE 2008), and TAT (t) is the global mean
surface temperature above pre-industrial levels. Based on expert advice, Weitzman
Nordhaus damage function
Weitzman damage function
Temperature
rise in °C
Note: The lower , the higher climate damage.
Figure 1. Comparison of behavior of the Nordhaus and Weitzman damage functions.
As in most standard IAMs, the social welfare function in DICE is grounded in 
discounted utilitarianism. It can be formalized as
1This means zero discounting over the finite time horizon of DICE, with zero weight given to later generations. This 
can be regarded to approximate, in a theoretical sense, an approach that discounts the entire infinite temporal series of U 
with a small positive discount rate (Posner, 2005).
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(2012) proposes an alternative damage function which we will use as well in our
simulations, namely
(t) ¼ 1=[1þ (TAT (t)=20:46)2 þ (TAT (t)=6:081)6:754]: (3)
This effectively introduces a tipping point where the damaged function describes large
impacts beyond 6C temperature increase. Here, the specification generates approxi-
mately 50% damage at 6C. Figure 1 illustrates the different behaviors of the functions
in (2) and (3). Although hardly visible, the Weitzman damage is slightly lower than
Nordhaus damage for temperature increases from 0.5 up to a little above 2.5C, while
Weitzman damages are larger for higher increases in temperature.
3. The Chichilnisky Welfare Criterion
Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) proposed axioms to assure a sustainable development.
These required that neither the present nor future generations dictate outcomes, in
other words, an equal treatment of the present and the future. Based on this, she derives
an alternative social welfare specification which includes the discounted utility
framework as an extreme case: it maximizes a weighted average of a discounted sum
of utilities plus the terminal utility value (assuming a finite time horizon). This welfare
criterion W can be expressed as (Chichilnisky, 1996):
W(c) ¼ 
X1
t¼1
t1ut(ct)þ (1 ) lim
t!1 ut(ct) (4)
with weight  for which 0 <  < 1 holds. In order to examine sensitivity of results to
the discount rate value, we apply criterion (4) using the standard DICE discount rate
and compare this with standard DICE results under (1) as well as with results when the
lower Stern (2007) discount rate is applied.
This criterion is clearly sensitive to what happens in both the present and the
(distant) future. It thus overcomes the shortcoming of discounted utilitarianism (the
NPV criterion) in which the present dictates the outcome in disregard for the future due
to assigning a monotonously decreasing weight to utility over time. The underlying
welfare axioms are defined by Chichilnisky as sustainable preferences. In models with
finite time horizons the Chichilnisky criterion coincides with discounted utilitarianism,
i.e., an NPV based on discounting future streams of instantaneous utility. The terminal
utility term is known as the “green golden rule” (equivalent to  ¼ 0), represented as
max limt!1 u(Ct) (Beltratti et al., 1995). In this study, we examine the implications of
the Chichilnisky criterion for the abatement of greenhouse gasses.2 In the numerical
exercise later on in the paper, we use a pragmatic approach, namely replacing the limit-
to-infinity part of the final term of the Chichilnisky criterion by a non-discounted
2Saving rates are the same in all of our model runs since we use the standard DICE model parameters in which saving 
rates are calibrated to meet observed savings (Nordhaus, 2008).
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utility term at the final horizon of the problem studied, which is the year 2200 which is 
the last period in the 2008 version of the DICE model that we use (Nordhaus, 2008). 
At that time a long run economic steady state has been reached in the DICE model 
which is based on a standard Solow growth model with a Cobb–Douglas production 
function and exogenous technological change (Estrada et al., 2015).3 We tested for so-
called boundary effects of choosing this last time period, which did not appear to be 
affecting our results.4 Evidently, the theoretical limit of utility in the infinite future 
cannot be captured by a numerical model. Our approximation provides, thought, rel-
evant insights by illustrating how attaching different utility weights to the very far 
future influences optimal climate policy.
Our approach, and arguably any other numerical approach, to the Chichilnisky 
criterion cannot deal with infinite time. We feel the infinite case is not so relevant 
anyway as climate-relevant decisions by humans will always be motivated by finite 
time horizons, even if long. It may be seen as an advantage that both the Chichilnisky 
and classical utilitarianism approaches in our paper deal with finite time horizons, as it 
allows for comparisons since similarly restrictive assumptions are made with regard to 
the time horizon. That is, it would be worse if one approach adopted an infinite and the 
other a finite time perspective.
The literature on the Chichilnisky criterion is predominantly theoretical (e.g., Le 
Kama et al., 2014). An exception is Tol (1999) who implements an adjusted version of 
the Chichilnisky criterion in FUND by defining welfare in the last period as the square 
of the deviation of CO2 concentrations in the year 2200 with a safe value of 550. 
Weight  is then set such that a business-as-usual concentration of 1793 ppm takes 
away half of the present value of welfare of the first generations (the NPV term in 
Eq. (4)), while for later generations the weight falls linearly to zero for the 21st and last 
generation (Tol, 1999). However, this approach resembles more a pure precautionary 
principle, as Tol himself also explains (see also Tóth (2000)).
An unresolved difficult issue is how to set the weight (1  ) assigned to the long-
run future (utility). Chichilnisky (2009, p. 5) suggests that it can be seen as “. .  . 
the marginal utility of the resource at the point of extinction. This is the point where 
the resource is presumably most valuable.” For the context of climate change this 
suggests the point where the climate system becomes very unstable or where the 
biosphere and human system become severely damaged, for example, suggesting 
a point where temperature increases with 6 and beyond (Weitzman, 2012). What 
would be the numerical value of the marginal utility of a resource close to 
extinction? Obviously, this question is very difficult to answer. Clearly the value 
would be very high which
3One can view our application as assuming that in the year 2200 a stationary steady state economy is reached, as has 
been predicted to occur in the future by prominent economic thinkers, like Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and John 
Maynard Keynes.
4The sensitivity of the results to time-boundary (edge) effects associated with the finite time horizon was examined by 
approximating the terminal utility term by the utility in period 59, which did not alter the results. Note further that a 
global optimum solution was found for the model optimization in GAMS for all model runs reported in this paper.
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would justify a value of (1 ) close to 1, which implies that  is extremely small.
Nevertheless, the interpretation of  does not result in an unambiguous numerical
value for , which is why we conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis on this pa-
rameter that includes extreme values.
4. Simulations with the Adapted DICE Model
Table 1 shows the temperature rise and associated economic output of the “optimal
policy” run of the DICE model for three welfare approaches, namely the original
Nordhaus welfare function, classic utilitarianism and the specification proposed by
Chichilnisky. A comparison of the standard model run and classical utilitarianism
shows the sensitivity of the results to the adopted discount rate: in particular, tem-
perature is stabilized at an increase of about 3.5C in the standard discounted utilitarian
welfare specification, while this is approximately 1C lower if no discounting is
applied (i.e.,  ¼ 0).
Optimal climate policy with the Chichilnisky criterion can be more or less stringent
than classical utilitarianism depending on the weight attached to the terminal utility
value. Large values of  imply results similar to those of the standard run. Perhaps it
makes intuitive sense to give the same weight to the “present” and far future. We
operationalize this by giving an equal weight to the terminal utility value as to the other
time periods — i.e., (1 ) ¼ 1=60 or alternatively  ¼ 59=60 — which results in
identical results (not shown in Table 1) as standard NPV. In other words, the results
shown at standard NPV in Table 1 also apply to Chichilnisky with (1 ) ¼ 1=60.5
It should be realized that while (1 ) ¼ 1=60 implies an equal weight of the sum
of the discounted utility term and the undiscounted terminal utility term, the values of
these utility terms may be quite different. The reason is that whereas the first term is
influenced by discounting, the second term is not. Moreover, the total consumption
level increases over time, due to economic and population growth, positively affecting
values of utility in later generations. In fact, a much larger population being exposed to
climate impacts in the far future could be a reason for adopting lower values of , even
though it gives little guidance on the exact weight to be used. More importantly,
extremely low values of  would be justified for making (1 ) represent the mar-
ginal utility value of a resource near the point of extinction. Small changes in  may
have large changes in DICE model results, because of the high value of final utility
which would increase over time due to population and economic growth.
5An alternative specification could be to normalize the weight of the discounted utility term in Eq. (4) to equal 1. This 
implies that the relative weight of the sum of the discounted utility term is high, resulting in very similar findings to the 
standard NPV results reported in Table 1, even when the Chichilnisky term has a high weight of  ¼ 0:111; in  
particular, the emission control rate is only 0.01 higher than standard NPV from the year 2105 onwards. Since this 
alternative specification basically delivers the same results as the standard DICE social welfare function and because 
our specification of the weight  in Eq. (4) is closer to the theoretical Chichilnisky criterion we prefer the specification 
of weights in Eq. (4).
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Table 1. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the
standard damage function and various social welfare specifications and
parameter values.
Year
2015 2055 2105 2155 2195
Standard NPV:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.78 2.69 3.30 3.47
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 138 270 494 781
Emission control rate 0.16 0.27 0.44 0.68 0.93
Classical utilitarianism:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.69 2.40 2.58 2.36
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 277 507 815
Emission control rate 0.25 0.41 0.67 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:19:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.80 2.71 3.30 3.27
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 278 506 799
Emission control rate 0.18 0.27 0.46 0.71 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:110:
Temperature rise in C 0.96 1.76 2.75 2.55 2.31
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 141 271 266 318
Emission control rate 0.05 0.29 1 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:111:
Temperature rise in C 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.94
Gross output in trillion US$ 56 92 150 231 322
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1
Chichilnisky green golden rule:
Temperature rise in C 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.94
Gross output in trillion US$ 64 92 213 231 322
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1
Climate policy is more stringent than standard NPV for small  weights, as these 
imply giving more importance to the terminal utility term. For example,  ¼ 0:19 
results in a slightly lower temperature increase after the year 2155.  ¼ 0:110 results in 
an optimal temperature rise that is close to classical utilitarianism. An even smaller 
weight  ¼ 0:111 results in a maximum optimal temperature rise of about 1C which is 
considerably lower than classical utilitarianism. Climate policy is very stringent early 
on as the emission control rate of 1 in 2015 indicates. Results with this small weight 
are the same as the green golden rule, which is not surprising given that  is very close 
to 0. It is clear from Table 1 that the more stringent climate policies obtained under 
Chichilnisky with  < 0:19 prevent large temperature increases that go at the expense 
of long-term economic output.
Of course, such small values of  raise questions about why it is so close to zero. 
One should note, however, that “small” and “close to zero” are relative concepts. They
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depend on the specification of utility, climate dynamics and feedback (damage) in
DICE, as well as on the number of generations as captured by the first term. Moreover,
we do not claim that the  should be so small, but simply mention threshold values
above for which the optimal strategy alters.
We conduct a sensitivity analysis by estimating optimal climate policy for the same
welfare specifications and parameter values using the Weitzman damage function in
Eq. (3) instead of the Nordhaus DICE one in (2). The results of this exercise are shown
in Table 2. Optimal temperature rises in the NPV run are lower than for the standard
damage function. This can be expected since the high temperature increases of more
than 3C, which are optimal under the standard damage function, are avoided when the
Weitzman function is used that implies large damages for such high temperature
rises (Fig. 1). The differences between the temperature rise in the NPV and classical
Table 2. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the
Weitzman damage function and various social welfare specifications and
parameter values.
Year
2015 2055 2105 2155 2195
Standard NPV:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.77 2.58 2.91 2.77
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 139 270 492 787
Emission control rate 0.16 0.30 0.58 0.88 1
Classical utilitarianism:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.71 2.36 2.42 2.20
Gross output in trillion US$ 73 150 293 539 871
Emission control rate 0.26 0.45 0.75 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:19:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.78 2.58 2.96 2.85
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 139 270 518 777
Emission control rate 0.16 0.30 0.59 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:110:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.87 2.20 1.98 1.82
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 138 182 233 320
Emission control rate 0.16 0.19 0.94 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:111:
Temperature rise in C 0.92 1.27 1.27 1.18 1.11
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 113 149 231 322
Emission control rate 0.61 0.82 1 1 1
Chichilnisky green golden rule:
Temperature rise in C 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.94
Gross output in trillion US$ 82 92 150 232 322
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1
9
utilitarianism runs are smaller than when the standard damage function is used, sug-
gesting that sensitivity of the results to the discount rate is less in case the damage 
function allows for more extreme climate change impacts. The Chichilnisky results are 
more sensitive now to the weight  than is the case for the standard damage function. 
Table 2 shows that optimal temperature rises with  ¼ 0:19 are slightly above those in 
the NPV run. This finding suggests that giving some more weight to the far future 
compared with the NPV run does not necessarily imply more drastic emission cuts 
with this damage function. This result could be due to a terminal time effect where we 
seek to increase consumption in the last period by decreasing the emission control rate 
in intermediate periods, reflected by a drop in the emission control rate at that time. 
Reducing the weight to  ¼ 0:110 results in a lower maximum temperature rise than 
under the NPV and classical utilitarianism, suggesting that in that case the aim of 
reducing long-term climate damages dominates. Temperature rise is even lower when 
 ¼ 0:111 which produces results that are not the same as the green golden rule, while 
these results were identical with the standard damage function.
Applying Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:111 results in slightly higher optimal tempera-
tures with the Weitzman damage function compared with the standard damage func-
tion. This may appear to be a surprising result. However, it should be kept in mind that 
the Weitzman damage function results in lower climate damages than the standard 
function for temperature rises below 2.5C, which is the relevant range for temperature 
rises under both damage functions when  ¼ 0:111. The Weitzman damage function 
allows for some higher optimal temperatures in this case, but sill limits temperature 
rise to 2.2C. Applying the green golden rule results in the same optimal temperatures 
regardless of the damage function, and implies drastic emission cuts under both 
damage functions applied here.
Another main uncertainty is the climate sensitivity parameter which indicates the 
long-term warming that results from a doubling of CO2 emissions. This parameter is 
set equal to 3C in the standard DICE model. Table 3 shows the results of increasing 
climate sensitivity to 4C which according to the IPCC (2014) falls within a likely 
range. The higher climate sensitivity implies that temperature increase is always higher 
than with the standard climate sensitivity results even for the most stringent climate 
policy under the Chichilnisky criterion. Moreover, under all welfare criteria early 
emission control rates are much more stringent if climate sensitivity is higher, 
reflecting higher benefits of emission abatement. Sometimes the Chichilnisky criterion 
results in a more lenient climate policy in later periods to boost consumption in the last 
period. Nevertheless, optimal maximum temperature rise according to the Chichilnisky 
criterion is always lower than under standard NPV.
Next, we examine sensitivity of using the Chichilnisky criterion with respect to the 
adopted discount rate. These model runs use again the standard DICE damage func-
tion, but the utility discount rate parameter  is reduced from the standard DICE value 
of 1.5% to 0.1%. This lower value is consistent with the discount rate used by Stern 
(2007), consistent with Botzen and van den Bergh (2012). This reduction of the
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Table 3. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the
standard damage function and various social welfare specifications, for
parameter values assuming a higher climate sensitivity.
Year
2015 2055 2105 2155 2195
Standard NPV:
Temperature rise in C 1.00 2.02 3.10 3.76 3.77
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 138 267 486 770
Emission control rate 0.19 0.31 0.52 0.81 1
Classical utilitarianism:
Temperature rise in C 0.99 1.91 2.68 2.70 2.51
Gross output in trillion US$ 72 149 290 535 864
Emission control rate 0.31 0.51 0.83 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:19:
Temperature rise in C 1.00 2.02 3.13 3.66 3.52
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 275 494 795
Emission control rate 0.19 0.32 0.53 0.99 0.95
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:110:
Temperature rise in C 1.00 2.03 3.01 3.14 2.99
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 273 257 326
Emission control rate 0.15 0.28 0.77 0.98 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:111:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.24 1.30 1.28 1.34
Gross output in trillion US$ 56 105 149 231 322
Emission control rate 1 1 1 0.98 0.74
Chichilnisky green golden rule:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.24 1.30 1.27 1.22
Gross output in trillion US$ 56 91 149 231 321
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1
discount rate implies a smaller optimal temperature rise with  ¼ 0:19 compared with 
the standard DICE discount rate. The same applies to using weight  ¼ 0:110 which 
results in a maximum temperature increase of about 2.8C using standard DICE dis-
counting and 2.6C using Stern discounting. Interestingly an opposite effect on climate 
policy of lowering the discount rate is found for Chichilnisky weight  ¼ 0:111. Using 
the standard discount rate, the terminal utility value completely dominates the sum of 
discounted utility component of the social welfare function resulting in a climate 
policy that is as stringent as  ¼ 0 (Table 1). However, this domination of the final 
term does not happen with the Stern discount rate resulting in a higher temperature rise 
(Table 4) than using the standard discount rate (Table 1). The reason is that lowering 
the discount rate implies that the sum of discounted utility component of the 
Chichilnisky social welfare function increases in relative importance to the terminal 
utility value (Eq. (4)). Therefore, the usual result in standard discounted utilitarianism
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Table 4. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the
standard damage function and various social welfare specifications and
parameter values, using Stern discounting.
Year
2015 2055 2105 2155 2195
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:19:
Temperature rise in C 0.95 1.70 2.42 2.65 2.42
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 277 506 814
Emission control rate 0.24 0.40 0.65 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:110:
Temperature rise in C 0.94 1.66 2.39 2.57 2.32
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 277 506 814
Emission control rate 0.34 0.40 0.66 1 1
Chichilnisky with  ¼ 0:111:
Temperature rise in C 0.90 1.87 2.00 1.79 1.66
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 140 160 242 332
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1
that a lower discount rate implies a more stringent climate policy does not always hold 
for the Chichilnisky welfare criterion and depends on the weight . Evidently, results 
of  ¼ 0 are not sensitive to the discount rate used since in that case the nondiscounted 
terminal utility value receives the full weight regardless.
Figure 2 shows the optimal CO2 emissions for different social welfare specifications 
in DICE using the standard damage function and utility discount rate. Applying 
classical utilitarianism results in a smooth emissions curve that has a shape similar to 
that under standard NPV, but is always below the latter. Emission pathways under 
Chichilnisky are very sensitive to the weight attached to the terminal utility value. The 
emissions curve of  ¼ 0:19 lies slightly above the standard NPV curve until the year 
2105, and afterwards emissions decline more steeply. Under Chichilnisky with weight 
 ¼ 0:110 emissions are allowed to rise more steeply over the course of this century, 
but drop strongly around 2100. This suggests that the final utility term dominates the 
decision criterion from the year 2100 onwards since the emission pathway becomes the 
same as under the green golden rule. Increasing the weight of the final utility even 
more (Chichilnisky with weight  ¼ 0:111) results in an optimal emission pathway that 
is already after the year 2025 exactly the same as the green golden rule (not shown in 
Fig. 2 because it would hamper readability of the figure). The green golden rule 
implies immediate drastic cuts of greenhouse gas emissions.
The comparison of the curves for the Chichilnisky weight 0.110 and classical 
utilitarianism is insightful. It shows that the latter, because it gives more weight to 
intermediate time periods relative to early time periods, stimulates an optimal emis-
sions pattern that is lower already initially, to reduce damages for intermediate time
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Figure 2. Optimal CO2 emissions in DICE with the standard damage model for different social 
welfare specifications and parameter values.
periods (or generations). The Chichilnisky criterion in this case leads to a more ex-
treme strategy, namely emitting a lot initially to benefit early generations who have a 
high utility weight in the NPV criterion, and then at some time radically shifting to 
very low emissions (consistent with the green golden rule) to benefit the terminal 
utility (or generation). In a way, the combination of NPV and terminal utility term in 
the Chichilnisky criterion mean for this specific weight value that early and final time 
periods (generations) dominate the outcomes, where intermediate ones receive less 
weight and therefore less concern. The distribution of emissions is less extreme for 
classical utilitarianism as all generations receive an equal weight. This can be a reason 
to prefer the classical utilitarianism over the Chichilnisky term, also because the 
motivation of the weight in the latter is difficult, and we have shown that the policy 
results are very sensitive to its specific value.
Existing studies which are most comparable with our approach are Tol (1999, 2013) 
and Dietz and Asheim (2012). Tol (1999) applies a modification of the Chichilnisky 
criterion in the climate-economy model FUND (see Sec. 3). His results show that a 
Chichilnisky-like criterion results in a more stringent climate policy than the standard 
NPV and than model runs with lower than standard discount rates. We find similar 
results for the Chichilnisky criterion compared with standard NPV for low-values of 
weight . We additionally show that using a lower than standard discount rate may 
result in more or less stringent climate policies dependent on weight . However, Tol’s 
implementation of the Chichilnisky criterion as a target greenhouse gas concentration
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level may be interpreted as an application of the precautionary principle (Tóth, 2000) 
which deviates from our approach.
Tol (2013) applies a Bentham–Rawls criterion proposed by Alvarez–Cuadrado and 
Van Long (2009), which is a social welfare function that maximizes the weighted sum of 
NPVof welfare and the welfare of the worst-off generation. This may be interpreted as a 
special case of the Chichilnisky criterion in case the last generation is the poorest. This 
could only happen if climate change impacts were to offset growth, something which is 
unlikely according to Tol (2013). Hence, the Bentham–Rawls criterion will generally 
generate outcomes that differ from those of our approach. A numerical illustration by 
Tol (2013) indeed shows that the Bentham–Rawls criterion only results in more strin-
gent emission abatement than standard discounted utilitarianism when extreme para-
meters are used, notably, a high probability of decreasing utility over time, a high weight 
on the utility of the worst-off generation, and very high climate change damage.
Dietz and Asheim (2012) adapt the Nordhaus (2008) DICE model to implement a 
sustainable discounted utilitarianism criterion. This welfare function only applies a 
zero discount rate as in classical utilitarianism if the present is better off than the future, 
and a positive discount rate if the future is better off than the present. This latter 
discount rate condition is consistent with the rank-discounted utilitarian criterion 
proposed by Zuber and Asheim (2012), who also proposed the alternative of using 
negative discount rates when future generations are worse off than the present. Dietz 
and Asheim (2012) combined the implementation of the sustainable discounted util-
itarianism criterion with an extensive sensitivity analysis of uncertain parameters in 
DICE using Monte Carlo simulations. This risk analysis implies that the probability 
that a generation is better off than its descendants is nonnegligible. Using the standard 
DICE discount rate, their results show that sustainable discounted utilitarianism results 
in slightly more stringent emission reductions than under standard discounted utili-
tarianism. For example, in the year 2150 the optimal emission control rates are about 
0.65 and 0.7 under sustainable and standard discounted utilitarianism, respectively 
(Dietz and Asheim, 2012). We find that the Chichilnisky criterion can result in much 
more stringent climate policies with early emission control rates equal or close to 1, 
dependent on weight .
5. Conclusions
Replacing in standard DICE the NPV by the Chichilnisky criterion does not alter the 
optimal climate policy if weights attached to the terminal utility value are small. Using 
only the final term of the Chichilnisky criterion, i.e., giving weight 1 to this and 0 to 
the discounted utility part, leads to a much more stringent policy, the so-called green 
golden rule. Using classical utilitarianism (zero discounting over the entire analysis 
period) leads to a less stringent policy than this, but to a more stringent policy than the 
NPV criterion. Climate policy under Chichilnisky can be more or less stringent than 
classical utilitarianism depending on the weight given to the far future.
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Overall, our study of the Chichilnisky criterion in DICE and extensive sensitivity 
analysis of other model parameters contribute to a broader literature showing that a 
variety of particular modifications in the DICE model can generate rapid emission 
control as the optimal strategy. A review by van den Bergh and Botzen (2014) illus-
trates that stringent climate policy are generally an economically efficient outcome in 
IAMs when low discount rates are used for intergenerational equity, and high climate 
damages are accounted for through appropriate damage function or climate sensitivity 
specifications. Moreover, once DICE generates the 100% emission control strategy as 
optimal due to changes in one of these discussed assumptions, it becomes insensitive 
to further modifications. That is, with multiple modifications, the strong policy re-
sponse is overdetermined, and additional modifications are not additive, i.e., do not 
alter the optimal strategy.
The pragmatic application of the Chichilnisky criterion here did not change results 
versus those of the NPV criterion for nonextreme weights. The strongest effects 
(differences with NPV) were found for a very high weight for the final Chichilnisky 
term. Sensitivity of results to the weight are larger when the Weitzman damage 
function is applied that allows for more extreme climate change impacts. If standard 
DICE is too optimistic about the damage function, climate sensitivity or growth of 
emissions without policy, extreme climate change with very high temperature changes 
is likely to create considerable differences in policy suggestions between NPV and 
Chichilnisky welfare criteria. This is particularly true if a Weitzman damage function is 
used.
A very high weight for the final term in the Chichilnisky criterion, as used by us to 
generate certain results, may be criticized as unrealistic. However, this can be nuanced 
in several ways. First, the further in time the final term is, the more the weight needs to 
compensate for the accumulation of (discounted) utilities at earlier points in time. In 
other words, the weight logically increases when environmental policies are evaluated 
that have very long run effects, like climate change. But for a higher discount factor, 
this compensation evidently would be smaller. That is, the weight decreases with the 
discount factor. Second, as was argued in Sec. 3, in the vein of Chichilnisky’s sug-
gestion that the weight represents “. .  .  the marginal utility of the resource at the point 
of extinction.”, the value is indeed high if one considers very extreme climate change 
endangering basic life support functions of humans as well as for other species —
witness the very high rates of biodiversity loss predicted under scenarios of extreme 
climate change (e.g., Stern, 2007).
We learn three things from this exercise. First, in terms of policy implications, for 
large weights  the Chichilnisky criterion effectively reduces to the NPV criterion. 
Second, the outcomes for the Chichilnisky criterion are highly sensitive in the range 
of very small weights. Third, in the latter case, the early and final time periods 
(generations) dominate the outcomes, while intermediate ones receive less weight and 
therefore less concern. Moreover, varying the discount factor (applying the Stern 
discount rate) we find that the usual result in standard discounted utilitarianism that a
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lower discount rate implies a more stringent climate policy does not always hold for 
the Chichilnisky welfare criterion and depends on the weight . The distribution of 
emissions is more uniform or less extreme under classical utilitarianism as here all 
generations receive an equal weight. Therefore, one may prefer classical utilitarianism 
over the Chichilnisky approach when a smooth emission reduction path is desired, 
for instance, because it reduces economic shocks and associated costs for society. 
Classical utilitarianism moreover has the advantage of avoiding two subjective 
choices, namely that of discount rate and Chichilnisky weight. On the other hand, 
various arguments have been put forward for positive discounting, at least in the short 
term. The advantage of the Chichilnisky approach is that it combines this with 
explicit concern for long-term sustainability. Adopting sustainable preferences as 
formalized in the Chichilnisky criterion in climate policy analysis has the advantage 
of explicitly giving attention to, and thus not downplaying, the very long-term 
implications of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere on the environment and human 
welfare.
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